NOBEL EXPECTATIONS

Probably like most of you I woke up to the news last week that our president had won the Nobel Peace Prize and responded with “Really?” To his credit, it appears that President Obama had the same reaction.

Since then, debate has ensued as to whether he deserved it—“SNL” even weighed in—although I found Liz Cheney’s recommendation that the president send the mother of a fallen soldier to accept the award in his stead the funniest response. Not the suggestion itself—I just found the idea of anybody with the last name of Cheney giving advice on international protocol, let alone on proper etiquette, for accepting the Nobel Peace Prize a little like Roseanne Barr giving out singing lessons. But I digress.

The general consensus is that Obama won the Nobel because he isn’t George W. Bush, but more importantly this is an indication of what the rest of the world believes (dare I say, hopes) the president can do for the future. It is yet one more expectation to place on the tall stack of already precariously balanced high expectations for Obama. The concern is that the Nobel committee has been duped by President Obama’s rhetoric. The point that has these skeptics have missed—in fact, it has flown by them at light speed—is that words do matter. 

For instance:

“We the People,” “All men are created equal,” the 272 words spoken by Lincoln at Gettysburg, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” “We will never surrender,” “Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country,” and “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”

Hopefully, I’ve made my point. Words can give us hope and unite us in the pursuit of a common goal, even the common good. If your hopes and aspirations are tapped out, that’s understandable since the last eight years have been difficult. But some of us haven’t tossed in the towel yet and surprise, surprise, some of us aren’t even American. Words can set goals, sometimes lofty goals.

The supreme irony here is that while being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize President Obama is weighing his most significant decision as commander-in-chief –what to do about the war in Afghanistan. Specifically, does he acquiesce to General McChrytsal’s not-so private request of adding 40,000 more troops to this eight-year war?

We can debate if the general went rogue or MacArthur on the president. I say no. The general hasn’t brought up nuclear weapons, the Yalu River and he doesn’t have a comb-over. I believe this public request is military backlash from the last administration. Generals who privately asked for more resources were fired—quickly and unceremoniously. McChrystal has simply gone on record—publicly—with what he believes he needs to do the job. I respect that, but it does beg the question: What’s the job? What’s the endgame in Afghanistan? This is where we need a little less rhetoric and a lot more specifics from all sides.

Maybe I’m a little slow, but I have no clue as to what our goal is in Afghanistan. Initially, the U.S. mission was very precise. We were going to destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps, rid the country of the Taliban and, of course, find and/or kill Osama Bin Hidin.

We’ve accomplished –I think—one of those tasks. We can debate all the reasons, starting with the invasion of Iraq, as to why the results after eight years are so meager. But before we start using terms like victory and cut and run or debate troop levels it seems readily apparent to this non-military person that someone needs to define what winning is. After that we can start figuring tactics, strategies, and resources needed.

This ambiguous or even absent set of goals is what I find most disturbing and most similar to what happened with the Vietnam War—particularly, the disconnect between Washington, D.C. and the battlefield. There are very poignant lessons we need to learn from the Vietnam War. Years after the fall of Saigon in a meeting between the military brass of both countries, an American general made the observation to North Vietnamese General Giap (I believe) that on the field of battle the U.S. military always handily defeated the North Vietnamese army.

Giap’s response: “Correct, but irrelevant.”

The explanation being that while U.S. military policy evolved into trying to convince the North Vietnamese government they couldn’t win the war, the North Vietnamese goal was simply not to lose it. Giap, among other things, masterminded the ambush of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 that sent the French packing and the Tet Offensive in 1968 that sent Walter Cronkite and LBJ packing. This isn’t a backhanded pat on the back for the North Vietnamese. This is about understanding your enemy, who in Southeast Asia were willing to die to the last man for their cause. Sound familiar?

This conundrum of military goals and strategy needs to be taken into account as the U.S. military and President Obama evaluate the Afghani War. History has proven that Afghanistan is just as big of a black hole as Vietnam—just ask the British and the Russians.

On the heels of winning the Nobel Peace Prize and with the international community’s full attention, President Obama has the opportunity to retool the plan for Afghanistan and strike a significant blow to Islamic terrorism while building a coalition of more than three countries. We may not be able to change the world, but we can make it safer. And we don’t have to do it alone.